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Subsequent Remedial Measures and the Louisiana Code of
Evidence: Some Thoughts on Interpretation
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Louisiana Code of Evidence' manifests legis-
lative will aimed at modernizing and unifying existing statutory and
jurisprudential authority which previously governed the admissibility of
evidence in Louisiana courtrooms.' The Louisiana Code of Evidence
follows the basic structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence and in so
doing imbues Louisiana evidence law with principles and rules prom-
ulgated by the federal judicial system and state jurisdictions that have
followed the federal model.3 However, the Louisiana Code of Evidence
is by no means a carbon copy of its federal counterpart. The work of
the Louisiana State Law Institute and influence of groups actively in-
volved in the legislative process has produced a divergence between
Louisiana's evidentiary rules and the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 The
adherence of the Louisiana Code of Evidence to the structure and
precepts of the federal rules is qualified by areas of dissatisfaction with
substantive policy choices articulated by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Hence, the Louisiana Code of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence are different breeds of the same animal, and the Louisiana Code
is embodied with rules and concerns which reflect different policy choices
along with various local interests involved in its creation.
Louisiana's present code article governing the admissibility of sub-
sequent remedial measures exemplifies a rule which distinguishes the
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. The Louisiana Code of Evidence became effective January 1, 1989 (1988 La.
Acts No. 515).
2. G. Pugh, R. Force, G. Rault & K. Triche, Handbook of Louisiana Evidence
Law V-IX (West 1989) [hereinafter La. Evid. Handbk.].
3. Id. at IX.
4. The day before the Code's consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee was
the setting for a massive compromise session by groups interested in the policies enunciated
by the Louisiana Code of Evidence. Among those involved were the Louisiana Trial
Lawyer's Association, the Louisiana District Attorney's Association, the Women's Lobby
Network and the Louisiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence. The original bill, which
reflected the work of the Louisiana State Law Institute, was amended to protect the
concerns of the lobbying groups listed above. For a complete discussion of the Louisiana
Code of Evidence's development, see Pugh, Force, Rault and Triche, The Louisiana Code
of Evidence-A Retrospective and Prospective View, 49 La. L. Rev. 689 (1989). Subsequently
reproduced in La. Evid. Handbk., supra note 2.
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Louisiana Code of Evidence from the Federal Rules of Evidence. Al-
though the Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 is similar in structure
and principle to Federal Rule 407, the article significantly deviates in
substance from the federal provision.' Louisiana Code of Evidence article
407 reads:
In a civil case, when, after an event, measures are taken which,
if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
event. This article does not require the exclusion of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving
ownership, authority, knowledge, control, or feasibility of pre-
cautionary measures, or for attacking credibility.
There are several reasons why interpretation and application of the
new article will be problematical for courts. First, there has been con-
siderable controversy over the application and proper interpretation of
Federal Rule 407 since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.6
Hence, even though federal sources are available for use in interpreting
the Louisiana article when the federal rule is similarly worded, those
sources can be confusing.7 Second, where substantive differences between
the Louisiana article and the federal rule exist, legislative history, sub-
stantive tort law, and pre-code jurisprudence s make interpretation of
article 407 difficult. This comment will endeaver to explore and solve
the various problems which might arise in interpreting Louisiana Code
of Evidence article 407 in light of the article's language, prior federal
and Louisiana jurisprudence, legislative history, and substantive tort law.
5. Fed. R. Evid. 407 reads:
When after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures
when offered for another purpose, such as providing ownership, control, feas-
ibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
6. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective July 1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 926.
7. See Hoffman and Zuckerman, Tort Reform and Rules of Evidence: Saving the
Rule Excluding Subsequent Remedial Actions, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 497 (1987); Note,
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measure Evidence in Diversity Actions Based on
Strict Products Liability, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1485 (1985); Note, Admissibility of Remedial
Measures Evidence in Products Liability Actions: Towards a Balancing Test, 39 Hastings
L.J. 1197 (1988); Comment, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures as Evidence
in Texas, St. Mary's L.J. 121 (1988); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to Rule
407: Limitations on the Introduction of Subsequent Measures, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 901
(1988); Note, Comity and Tragedy: The Case of Rule 407, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 585 (1985).
8. Toups v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1988).
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In accordance with the Code of Evidence, the analytic framework for
resolving these problems shall be guided by dual concerns of fairness
and efficiency in administering the law of evidence. 9
The evolution of the rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in tort cases will be traced from its common law inception to
its adoption by Congress for the Federal Rules of Evidence. The general
rule against admissibility will be analyzed with special emphasis afforded
to problems associated with applying the rule in areas other than pure
negligence cases. Louisiana's provision will be analyzed in light of our
state's tort system. The comment will conclude that the general rule of
407 should be applied to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures in all delictual action to insure fair application of the article's
evidentiary protection.
The comment will also explore 407's unique exceptions to exclusion
of subsequent remedial measure. Assessing the effect of the "knowledge"
exception will pose the question whether Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 407 is workable in light of its historical purpose. The comment
will conclude that the "knowledge" exception might result in evidence
of subsequent measures being admitted to prove negligence while being
excluded to prove other issues of delictual liability.
II. LEOAL HISTORY
The common law of negligence provided the initial battleground
which spawned the rule excluding subsequent remedial measures to show
a defendant's culpable conduct. 10 Baron Bramwell of the English Court
of Exchequer laid the cornerstone of the rule when he stated:
[P]eople do not furnish evidence against themselves by adopting
a new plan in order to prevent the recurrence of an accident.
I think that a proposition to the contrary would be barbarous.
It would be, as I have often had occasion to tell jurors, to
hold that, because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore
it was foolish before."
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court recognized the rule in
Columbia Railroad Company v. Hawthorne.'2 The suit in Columbia
Railroad was brought to recover damages resulting from an allegedly
unsafe and defective machine used in a sawmill. The machine was altered
9. La. Code Evid. art. 102.
10. Hoffman and Zuckerman, supra note 7, at 498-99.
11. Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., 21 L.T.R N.S. 261, 263 (1869)
(Cited by the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules of Evidence in support of Fed.
R. Evid. 407 (Advisory Committee's note)).
12. 144 U.S. 202, 12 S. Ct. 591 (1892).
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after the accident and the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of the
alteration to prove the negligence of the corporation owning the sawmill.
The Court held that admission of the evidence would "distract the minds
of the jury from the real issue, and create a prejudice against the
defendant."' 3 The opinion illustrates early legal thought on issues re-
garding the admissibility of evidence by balancing the probative value
of evidence, the risks of juror confusion, and prejudice to the defen-
dant. 14
Over the years, decisions excluding such evidence have focused less
on the lack of probative value offered by the evidence. Instead, the
exclusion has been justified by a policy of encouraging, or not dis-
couraging, the undertaking of subsequent safety measures.'" The argu-
ment in support of the rule postulates that admission of subsequent
repairs would be tantamount 'to permitting an inference of fault and
that all defendants, negligent and prudent, would be discouraged from
improving the place, thing, or behavior which caused the injury. 6
While the policy consideration is the primary justification offered
by courts in excluding such evidence, the rule is also based in part on
the relevancy judgment that other reasons exist for a defendant to make
a change or repair after the occurrence of an accident. Once evidence
of the repair is admitted, ensuing juror confusion from relevancy as-
sessments is apt to prejudice the defendant by raising the inference that
such repairs are acknowledgments of negligence by the party making
the repair. '7 The common law rule excluding subsequent remedial meas-
ures as evidence of negligence has been accepted in some form by every
state except Maine. 8
Today, exceptions to the exclusionary rule include offering subse-
quent remedial measures to prove ownership or control19 and presenting
such evidence to illustrate the feasibility of precautionary measures. 20
Likewise, the rule is not applicable when assessing evidence which rebuts
assertions made by an opposing party. Furthermore, when the repairs
13. Id. at 207.
14. Id. at 208.
15. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 275, at 815 (3d ed. 1984).
16. Wigmore, II Wigmore on Evidence, § 283 (3d ed. 1940).
17. Granada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th
Cir. 1983); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 275; Note, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial
Measures Evidence in Diversity Actions Based on Strict Product Liability, 53 Fordham
L. Rev. 1485, 1486 (1985).
18. Note, supra note 17, at 1486. Me. R. Evid. provides: "When after an event,
measures are taken which if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is admissible."
19. Wigmore, supra note 16, § 283, at 158.
20. Fed. R. Evid. 407. See also Rule 407, Fed. R. Evid. 207 Advisory Committee's
Note.
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or changes are precipitated by third persons, the policy grounds for per
se exclusion are no longer at issue and the tendency of courts is to
admit the evidence subject to general relevancy requirements and the
40321 balancing test.22
The merging of the common law rule into Federal Rule of Evidence
407 represents congressional recognition of two fundamental concerns.
First, the conduct evidenced by subsequent measures has alternate ex-
planations and is therefore not an admission of fault. Secondly, Congress
sought to avoid discouraging persons from taking steps which make the
world safer for fear of having subsequent prudence admissible at trial. 23
Louisiana's adoption of a provision similar to the federal rule evidences
concerns similar to those held by federal policy makers. 24
III. TBE STRICT LIABILITY Dnm nIA
The development of strict liability2 over the past several decades
has tested the applicability of the established rule which excludes evidence
of subsequent remedial measures. Some courts have held that evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in product liability cases. 26
21. Fed. R. Evid. 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
22. E. Cleary, supra note 15, § 275, at 816.
23. A rule which allowed the admission of subsequent remedial measures would act
as a deterrent toward taking prudent measures after an accident. Fed. R. Evid. 407,
Advisory Committee's Note.
24. La. Evid. Handbk., supra note 2, at 217, Article 407, Author's Note (1).
25. To establish strict liability in tort, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant marketed
a defective-unreasonably dangerous-product. Although the inquiry focuses on the condition
of the product, the condition of the product imputes to the conduct of the manufacturer
thereby providing a variation of the reasonable man standard applied in negligence. Keeton,
Dobbs, Keeton and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter Keeton]. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965):
(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
26. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill..App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972)
(Illinois court does not extend rule to strict liability); Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises,
196 Ct. 134, 491 A.2d 389 (Conn. 1985) (Connecticut follows the Illinois court).
107319911
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The landmark case recognizing the strict liability exception is the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court pronouncement in Ault v. International Harvestor.2 7
In Ault, the court explored the rationale behind the exclusionary
rule and concluded that the policy considerations of encouraging sub-
sequent safety do not extend logically to strict liability. The court rea-
soned that it would be antithetical to a manufacturer's interest to forego
improvements in its product and risk additional lawsuits simply to avoid
admitting possible liability in a single suit.2" This rumination is based
on the assumption that different economies of scale breed different
policy considerations.
In terms of statutory analysis, the court noted the deletion of the
phrase "strict liability" from the language of the California Evidence
Code provision.29 The court, reasoning a contrario3° in classic civilian
fashion, found this deletion to be evidence of legislative intent to exclude
strict liability from the parameters of the statute's general rule."
Interpretation of Federal Rule 407 by the federal system has gen-
erated a split of authority. Two circuit courts, the Eighth and Tenth,
have applied the Ault reasoning,32 while the Fifth Circuit in Granada
Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Company3 held that Rule 407 applies
in strict liability cases. The Granada Steel court reasoned that evidence
of subsequent repair or change has little relevance in determination of
the ultimate issue in a strict liability case: whether the product was
defective at the time of the accident.34 The focal point of the court's
concern was a juror's ability to concentrate on the issue of defectiveness
without being confused by the evidence of subsequent repair. 5 The court,
reasoning a pari ratione,36 concluded that since the relevancy concerns
27. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148 (1974).
28. Id. at 120, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816, 528 P.2d at 1152.
29. Cal. Evid. C. § 1151 provides:
When after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are
taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event less
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
30. Rieg, Judicial Interpretation of Written Rules, 40 La. L. Rev. 49, 60 (1979):
"This reasoning consists of turning around the statement of a text in order to draw a
new inference therefrom and is, therefore, founded on the premise that if a text asserts
something, it is supposed to negate the contrary."
31. 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17, 528 P.2d at 1152-53.
32. See Unterberger v. Snow Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Herndon v.
Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958,
104 S. Ct. 1970 (1983).
33. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 887.
35. Id. at 888.
36. Levasseur, Materials for the Course in Louisiana Civil Law System, 342-1 (LSU
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embodied in Federal Rule 407 are the same in both product liability
and negligence cases, the rule should be applied with equal vigor in
both.
The analysis of the Granada Steel opinion avoids the perplexity of
trying to assess whether the policy considerations of Rule 407 are in-
applicable to strict liability defendants. By electing an across-the-board
application of the rule to all tort cases, the court rejects the Ault court's
precarious distinctions based on psychoanalyzing manufacturer behavior.
The Fifth Circuit view is shared by the majority of federal appellate
courts which likewise require the exclusion of remedial measures in strict
liability actions. 37 A fruitful discussion of the issue was articulated by
the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Werner v. Upjohn Co.,
Inc. 31 In Werner, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that the
defendant, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer, had published a subsequent
warning which revealed that one of its drugs created dangerous side
effects. The court conceded the 'existence of some distinction between
negligence and strict liability but reasoned that a suit based on either
theory is against the manufacturer and not the product.39 The Werner
court refused to deny 407's evidentiary protection to a defendant based
on a precarious distinction between product liability and pure negligence.
Expressing the difficulty inherent in trying to differentiate negligence
from strict liability, the court wrote:
The distinction between the two lessens considerably in failure
to warn cases since it is clear that strict liability adds little in
warning cases. Under a negligence theory the issue is whether
the defendant exercised due care in formulating and updating
the warning, while under a strict liability theory the issue is
whether the lack of a proper warning made the product unrea-
sonably dangerous. Though phrased differently the issue under
either theory is essentially the same: was the warning adequate?40
SBA 1981). This method of reasoning is used to extend a given rule of law applicable
to a certain situation to a similar situation not specifically contemplated by the rule of
law. Initially, one must first ascertain the "reason" for the given rule of law. Secondly,
one must establish a similarity between the facts of the text of the given law and the
facts of the unresolved problem. Thirdly, the proponent of expending the existing rule
of law must demonstrate that the reasoning underlying the rule of law should be applied
with equal vigor to the unprovided for situation. See also Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358
So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
37. Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v.
Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982); Oberst v. International Harvestor Co., Inc.,
640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S. Ct. 862 (1981).
38. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980).
39. Id. at 857.
40. Id. at 858.
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Louisiana tort doctrine might necessitate an interpretation of the Louis-
iana Code of Evidence article 407 similar to that given the federal rule
by the U.S. Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Since 407
unequivocally applies to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures to prove "negligence or culpable conduct," '4' the starting point of
interpretation should attempt to define the scope of "negligence or
culpable conduct." Both the jurisprudence and the Louisiana Product
Liability Act along with the exegesis of "fault" support applying 407
to all cases involving delictual liability.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "culpable conduct" as synonymous
with "blameable" conduct or conduct "involving the breach of a legal
duty or the commission of a fault.''42 In Louisiana, the Civil Code sets
forth the basis of Louisiana's system of "fault" in the broadest of
terms.'3 Legal scholars have suggested that all torts committed under
Louisiana law are "fault" based including those committed under both
strict and absolute liability." One court has suggested that "fault" is
a broad term which connotes "all conduct falling below a proper stan-
dard. ' 4  The Louisiana Supreme Court has opined that the civilian
concept of "fault" encompasses "within itself the potentiality of
growth." 46 Indeed, "fault" is often determined by courts according to
statutory duties imposed by the legislature and judicially created duties
of conduct developed in compliance with broad, general principles of
legislative will.' 7 As a result, Louisiana courts apply the term "fault"
to all conduct which gives rise to delictual or quasi-delictual obligations,
but "blameworthiness" and "moral wrongs" are rejected as too narrow
a testj for legal responsibility. 4
During the days of ancient Rome, early civilians referred to the
wilful harming of another as "dolus" while labeling the negligent harm-
ing of another as "culpa." ' 49 Today, the concept of liability based on
41. Lea v. Baumann Surgical Supplies, Inc., 321 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975),
writ denied, 325 So. 2d 279 (1976); La. Code Evid. art. 407 comment (b).
42. Black's Law Dictionary 341 (5th ed. 1979).
43. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 reads: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
44. See authorities collected in Galligan, The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making
Sense of It All, 49 La. L. Rev. 629, 640 n.66 (1989).
45. Williams v. Louisiana Machinery Co., Inc., 387 So. 2d 8, 11 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980).
46. Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (La. 1971) (citing
Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 159, 166).
47. Id. at 137. See also Tunc, Fault: A Common Name for Different Misdeeds, 49
Tul. L. Rev. 279 (1975).
48. Langlois, 249 So. 2d at 137.
49. F. Stone, 12 Louisiana Civil Treatise: Tort Doctrine § 59a, at 81 (1977) [hereinafter
Stone].
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fault expects each person in society to conform "with generally accepted
standards of the society in which he lives" with courts determining where
fault lies in a given situation. 0 Although liability based on "fault" has
evolved greatly since the days of the Romans, modern day Louisiana
courts still use the term "culpability" to describe the assignment of
fault even in cases of strict liability.5 For example, in determining
whether a thing poses an unreasonable risk of harm under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2317, the same courts consider "the degree of cul-
pability assignable to each party's conduct. '5 2 Under this view, one
might say that "culpability" is synonymous with the breach of a legal
duty whether that duty be legislatively or judicially imposed.
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 does not resolve the difficulty
of distinguishing between negligence or culpable conduct and other the-
ories of liability. The official comments to the article state that 407 is
inapplicable if the substantive law underlying the case is based on any
theory other than negligence or culpable conduct. 3 The comment pur-
posefully does not define those distinctions and does not expressly exclude
"strict liability" and "product liability" from the parameters of "cul-
pable conduct" or "negligence." This approach is wise in light of the
inability of judges and tort scholars to clarify the distinctions between
theories of delictual liability. 4 The comment is helpful in assessing
admissibility once the conduct is defined as culpable or non-culpable,
but the realm of tort law is suggested as the source for resolving
ambiguities which arise in defining tort liability.
Viewing culpability as "blameworthiness" resolves the issue by re-
stricting the application of 407 to causes of action based exclusively on
50. Stone, supra note 49, § 59a, at 82.
51. "Quite to the contrary, the plaintiff's negligence should carry more, not less,
consequence when the defendant is strictly liable, but less culpable than the plaintiff."
Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So. 2d 559, 560 (La. 1981). See also Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.
2d 270, 272 (La. 1975). "In the Louisiana Projet of 1825, as well as in the Code of
1825, the single long article delineating the liability of persons occupying positions of
responsibility for others was broken into several articles. When this was done, a drastic
change was made in the condition for culpability." (Emphasis added).
52. Verrett v. Cameron Telephone Company, 417 So. 2d 1319, 1325-26 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1982).
53. La. Code Evid. art. 407 comment (b).
54. V. Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability, 62 Tul.
L. Rev. 1303, 1306 (1988). Professor Palmer writes:
Guided only by intuition, strict liability has been a concept without a rudder,
sailing a boundless sea. In court decisions, philosophical debates, legislative
reform, and historical studies, the greatest uncertainty surrounds its meaning.
The need to understand the nature of this nebulous notion is not simply a
matter of intellectual curiosity. Our inability to define strict liability or to state
its affirmative criteria undermines the foundation of the subject and renders
suspect every assertion about it.
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human conduct whether it be by act or omission. However, it can also
be asserted that all delictual liability is "blameworthy." The blame need
not arise from the negligence of the tortfeasor, but may result from
the danger of the activity engaged in by the tortfeasor or the relative
economic position of a manufacturer to absorb losses caused by its
products. It is unpersuasive to eschew extension of "blameworthiness"
to strict and product liability simply because the process of determining
liability is different. The end result of all tort cases is a determination
of "fault" which implies that a losing defendant has not measured up
to societal expectations in a specific instance.
Utilizing this model also begets the question of whether this is a
fair and consistent interpretation of 407. If a-plaintiff alleges both strict
liability and negligence as bases of recovery in an action, it might not
be possible to avoid juror confusion when the evidence is ruled admissible
for one theory of recovery and inadmissible for the other. Both actions
place responsibility on the person whether through conduct, relational
interest, or ownership of the dangerous thing or building." Although
common law strict liability is "no fault" in the sense that the sole
inquiry is on the product and not the manufacturer's behavior,5 6 Louis-
iana jurisprudence has consistently held that the duty is the same in
strict liability and ordinary negligence cases, although the process for
determining the existence of the duty is different.5 7
The language of the Louisiana Product Liability Act" presents a
plausible argument for applying Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407
to cases arising under the Act. The Act provides that conduct or cir-
cumstances that give rise to a cause of action under its provisions
constitute "fault" within the meaning of Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.19 The Act is the exclusive remedy for recovery against manufac-
turers for injury from defective products, and the Act uses the word
"conduct" to describe "fault" in the context of product liability. 60 The
language of the Act creates a legal duty preventing manufacturers from
placing unreasonably dangerous products into the stream of commerce,
yet the Act avoids the terms "negligence" and "strict liability.' '61 The
55. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 requires the man to repair the damage caused by his
fault.
56. Keeton, supra note 25, § 99, at 695.
57. Dodson v. Webster Parish Police Jury, 564 So. 2d 760, 764 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 567 So. 2d 1127 (1990); Charles v. Bill Watson Hyundai, Inc., 559 So. 2d
872, 875 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 563 So. 2d 1154 (1990); Bell v. State, 553 So.
2d 902, 907 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
58. La. R.S. 9:2800.51-.59 (1990).
59. La. R.S. 9:2800.52 (1990). The Louisiana Product Liability Act became effective
September 1, 1988. 1988 La. Acts 64 § 1.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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only label gleaned from the language of the Act is "liability for man-
ufacturers of products." 62 Violation of the legal duty found in the Act
is "fault" under Louisiana tort doctrine and is, therefore, "culpable
conduct" if one finds culpability subsumed in the concept of fault.
The practical result of the affirmative defenses found in the Act is
to create a negligence inquiry which allows the manufacturer to escape
liability if it did not and could not have known of a safer design
alternative or warning which could have prevented the accident. 63 The
plaintiff need not show that the manufacturer was negligent to recover,
but the defendant can avoid liability upon a showing of non-negligence.
This scheme effectively shifts the burden of proof and creates a neg-
ligence inquiry." If the plaintiff uses a subsequent design change or new
warning to rebut the defendant's unknowability defense, then the core
purpose of the rule is violated and the evidence is used to show the
manufacturer's negligence. In design and warning cases, the Act walks
the middle ground between negligence and strict liability. 65
The availability of victim fault as a defense in product liability and
strict liability further blurs the distinction between negligence and strict
liability and provides another plausible argument for extending 407 to
all tort cases."6 The issue of victim fault allows evidence of the plaintiff's
conduct to shift the focus away from the alleged defects, and directs
attention to the other facts in the case. Analysis of the plaintiff's behavior
in a case where victim fault is raised is similar to the analysis of a
defendant's behavior in a negligence action.
The historic notions behind 407 might permit viewing "culpable
conduct" as a shibboleth for all delictual liability. At common law, the
idea of strict liability was not early recognized and torts arose from
either the negligent or wilful acts of the tortfeaser. 67 Allowing evidentiary
62. Id.
63. La. R.S. 9:2800.59 (1990).
64. "Overall, in view of the character of the manufacturer's foregoing affirmative
defenses, the manufacturer's duty under the new Products Liability Act appears, in practical
effect, to be a negligence standard. In measuring the manufacturer's design liability, the
focus of the new Act is on the manufacturer's conduct and knowledge equally as much
as the focus is on the product itself." Crawford and McDonald, Product Liability for
Design, 50 La. L. Rev. 531, 552 (1990).
65. One possible way of avoiding the problems addressed by 407 is to allow the
subsequent warning or design change to come into evidence without attributing the remedial
measure to the defendant facing potential liability. The subsequent change can be offered
to show the knowability of the design or warning change and feasibility of such a change.
The evidence would be admissible upon a showing of relevancy under 401 and the 403
balancing test.
66. La. Civ. Code art. 2323; Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985)
(Comparative fault should be assessed on a case by case basis in order to provide consumers
with an incentive to use a product safely.).
67. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law and Other Writings 79-80 (1888).
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protections to escape the evolution of tort law appears unjust. As the
law of torts expands to permit recovery based on novel theories, the
law of evidence should attempt to synthesize its rules in order to ensure
fairness among litigants. The distinctions between theories of tort re-
covery are simply not clear enough to deny 407's evidentiary protection
to some classes of defendants and not to others. Sweeping application
of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 to all delictual and quasi-
delictual actions might avoid anachronistic application of evidence law
which occurs when the evidence rules fall behind developments in the
substantive law of torts.
Prior to the enactment of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the
Louisiana Supreme Court grappled with the issue of a product's sub-
sequent modifications in Toups v. Sears Roebuck and Company." The
plaintiffs in Toups brought a product liability action against the man-
ufacturer of a water heater which ignited into a flash fire that severely
burned the plaintiff's three year old son. The water heater was located
in a small shed behind the Toups family residence. The shed also housed
a container of gasoline which produced vapors that were ignited by the
water heater's pilot light. The water heater bore no warning to caution
against storage of flammable liquids close to the water heater. After
the accident, Sears added such a warning to its heater. 69
A unanimous court held that the rule excluding subsequent remedial
measures has no place in the field of product liability where warnings
or alternative designs are at issue. 70 First, the court accepted the Ault
reasoning that the policy considerations behind the rule are not germane
when strict liability is involved. 7' Secondly, the court concluded that the
California court's position was in accord with proposed Louisiana Code
of Evidence article 40772 which had yet to be put in its present form
and adopted. Since the earlier proposed form of 407 was in accord with
prior Louisiana law, said the court, 407 added nothing substantial to
the analysis because prior Louisiana law did not extend the rule to non-
negligence cases. 7 Thirdly, the court found that the evidence was relevant
because it might have persuaded the jury of the warning's necessity.7 4
The supreme court reversed the appellate court finding which had ex-
68. 507 So. 2d 809.
69. 507 So. 2d 809, 811.
70. Id. at 818.
71. Id. at 816-17.
72. The article proposed by the Louisiana State Law Institute used the identical
language found in Federal Rules of Evidence 407. The proposed article facing the court
in Toups was the article proposed by the Law Institute and not the rule finally adopted
by the legislature for inclusion in the Louisiana Code of Evidence.
73. Id. at 817-18.
74. Id. at 818.
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onerated the manufacturer, and the case was remanded to the court of
appeal to fix the quantum of damages. 75
With the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the holding
of Toups might be reconsidered for several reasons. The court's finding
that admission of such evidence is in accord with prior Louisiana law
is unfounded. Prior jurisprudence excluded evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures to prove negligence.7 6 No Louisiana legal authority has
made exception for strict liability cases and at least one Louisiana
appellate court, in an opinion not cited in Toups, upheld exclusion of
such evidence in a tort action against a manufacturer for allegedly
defective brakes. 77 In addition, the Toups court relied on authority from
other jurisdictions but ignored the contrary federal jurisprudence which
interpreted the same rule.
The mere fact that the rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures did not apply should not have automatically resulted in ad-
mission of the subsequent modifications into evidence. For the evidence
to be deemed admissible, it must be relevant and the relevance must
not be substantially outweighed by the possibility of juror confusion
and prejudice to the defendant. 7 The court, without any clear expla-
nation, simply concluded that the evidence was probative of the man-
ufacturer's duty to provide a warning.79
The trial court in Toups excluded the evidence because the court
concluded the prejudice outweighed any probative value that the evidence
might have provided. In reviewing the trial court's decision to exclude
the warning, the supreme court should not have disturbed the trial
court's ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. 0 By overruling the
trial judge without discussion of the prejudice issue, the supreme court
implies that exclusion of such evidence based on Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 403 is a clear abuse of trial court discretion as a matter
of law. This observation is buttressed by the fact that the court chose
not to remand the case for a new trial and allow the defendant to rebut
the evidence of the subsequent warning. The thrust of this analysis
portends that trial judges apparently may not exclude evidence of sub-
sequent modifications under the authority of either Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 407 or article 403 because of its potential to persuade
a jury of the defendant's fault.
75. Id. at 819.
76. See Note, Toups v. Sears Roebuck and Co.: Re-Assessing Admissibility of Sub-
sequent Remedial Measures in a Products Liability Suit, 48 La. L. Rev. 985, 997 n.71
(1988).
77. Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
78. State v. Ludwig, 423 So. 2d 1073, 1977 (La. 1982).
79. 507 So. 2d 809, 818.
80. State v. Chaney, 423 So. 2d 1092 (La. 1982).
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Toups might be limited by the holding expressed in the actual opinion
which reads: "In a strict product liability case, evidence of such remedial
measures should be allowed insofar as they are relevant in establishing
what the manufacturer knew or should have known."'" Such a statement
places the court's reasoning on the horns of a dilemma. The court stated
earlier in the opinion that a manufacturer is conclusively presumed to
know of the defects of its product.12 If that proposition is true, then
evidence of the manufacturer's knowledge is never relevant because
"knowledge" is not a disputed issue in the case. On the other hand,
if knowledge is an issue in the case, then the action is no longer one
purely concerned with strict liability. "Constructive knowledge" inquiries
focus on the manufacturer and not the product, so that culpability
becomes an issue. If culpability is an issue, then 407 applies to exclude
the evidence. Under either scenario, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures should have been inadmissible according to the rule utilized
by the court.
It is evident that a Toups interpretation of Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 407 will encourage forum shopping by plaintiffs asserting
a cause of action under product liability. Defendant manufacturers will
remove cases when possible to federal court to avoid the evidentiary
handicap that Toups imposes. Conversely, plaintiffs will probably name
local sellers in their suit to avoid diversity of citizenship thereby litigating
the issue in Louisiana courts bound to apply the Toups rule. Both
federal and state courts will apply the Louisiana Product Liability Act
substantively in Louisiana, 3 but the evidentiary rules work differently
against defendants in Louisiana state court. Broad application of Louis-
iana Code of Evidence article 407 avoids such an anomalous result.
Notwithstanding a broad interpretation of Louisiana Code of Evi-
dence article 407, it is possible for the balancing test of Louisiana Code
of Evidence article 403 to ameliorate resulting unfairness which results
from the difference in rules in two forums. Such an approach lacks the
certainty of allowing the legislative determination of Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 407 to govern the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures since exclusion under 403 is determined according to the dis-
cretion of the trial court. The major problem with utilizing the 403
balancing process is the standard of review on appeal. If the admissibility
is balanced using 403, the appellate court will afford the trial judge
with a great deal of discretion.8 4 However, the per se rules of non-
admissibility found in 407 give the trial judge much less discretion-
81. 507 So. 2d 809, 816-17.
82. Id. at 816.
83. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
84. Supra note 80.
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presumably because the legislature does not want any balancing done
with evidence excluded by 407. Efficiency is likewise undermined since
plaintiffs will still be encouraged to "forum shop" in an attempt to
utilize favorable Louisiana evidence law.
IV. LouISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE 407: THE LAW GivETH
AND THE LAW TAKETH AWAY
The Louisiana version of 407 differs significantly from its federal
counterpart in the language chosen for the second sentence of the article.
First, exceptions to the general rule need not be controverted in order
for the trial judge to allow their application. The absence of this re-
quirement deviates from both the common law and the federal rule. 5
Secondly, the article allows evidence of subsequent remedial measures
to show knowledge or authority, or to attack credibility. These areas
of proof supplement exceptions in the federal rule which include evidence
offered to prove ownership, control, and feasibility of precautionary
measures.
8 6
Under literal reading of the article, the exceptions, particularly the
exception for evidence to show "knowledge," partially nullify the general
rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove neg-
ligence because in a traditional negligence case against the owner of a
thing, it is knowledge which gives rise to the duty to take reasonable
steps to protect against injurious consequences resulting from the risk. 7
While the comments indicate the law is consistent with prior Louisiana
law, 8 this writer is unable to find any prior existence of a "knowledge"
exception. Likewise, if a court is assessing a claim against a vendor for
selling an unreasonably dangerous product, knowledge of the potential
danger is the key element in finding the defendant liable. 9 The general
intent of the article is to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures to prove negligence, yet the "knowledge" exception seemingly con-
sumes the general rule because a finding of "knowledge" is crucial to
a finding of negligence. 9°
In a strict liability case, one standard for determining liability is to
presume the owner's knowledge of the risk presented by the thing under
the owner's control. 91 In light of this presumption, the court must still
assess the reasonableness of the owner's conduct "according to tradi-
85. See supra note 5. See also Hoffman and Zuckerman, supra note 7.
86. See Wigmore, supra note 16, § 283, at 158. See supra note 20.
87. Kent v. Gulf States Utilities, 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982).
88. La. Code Evid. art. 407 comment (a).
89. La. Civ. Code art. 2545; Harris v. Atlanta Stove Works, Inc., 428 So. 2d 1040
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 434 So. 2d 1106 (1985).
90. Supra note 87.
91. Id.
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tional notions of blameworthiness" which include balancing the prob-
ability of risk occurring, the gravity of the consequences, and the burden
of adequate precautions.93 In determining whether a thing poses an
unreasonable risk of harm under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317, the
court inquires as to blameworthiness and, in essence, culpability. The
net effect is that 407 does not apply to many negligence cases because
of the "knowledge" exception, yet it applies with full vigor to strict
liability cases due to the inherent blameworthiness inquiries. Ironically,
the addition of the "knowledge" exception exempts 407's applicability
only in instances where "knowledge" is an issue.
Another possible problem is evident with the absence of the "if
controverted" requirement for the exceptions' applicability. Commen-
tators suggest that such problems can be resolved with the 403 balancing
test.94 This approach leaves the deferential decision of admissibility with
the trial court even though Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 is
premised on per se exclusion of such evidence. While the results may
be the same under either Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 403 or
407, the process of assessing admissibility is subverted by diverting per
se questions of admissibility to an analytic framework which balances
competing interests. However, the commentators are persuasive in their
assessment of ultimate admissibility since it is very doubtful whether
uncontroverted issues will be allowed to supply the admission of oth-
erwise inadmissible evidence.
Since the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the First
Circuit Court of Appeal has strictly applied the rule excluding subsequent
remedial measures. The plaintiff in Northern Assurance Company of
America v. Louisiana Power and Light9" attempted to show corrective
measures taken by an electrical company to recircuit electricity after
electrical fires. The plaintiff was an insurance company subrogee at-
tempting to collect reimbursement for benefits paid to the insured for
a residential fire. The fire was allegedly caused by the residential supplier
of electricity. The trial court admitted evidence of the corrective measures
and the Court of Appeal reversed the ruling after applying the principles
of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 by analogy to the case at
the time of the trial. 96
92. Id.
93. Verrett v. Cameron Telephone Company, 417 So. 2d 1319, 1324 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1982).
94. La. Evid. Handbk., supra note 2, at 227, Author's Note 2.
95. 561 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted, 565 So. 2d 422 (1990).
96. 561 So. 2d 770, 773 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
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In conclusion, the language of the article is clear. The careful choice
of exceptions to the rule may indicate a legislative policy to narrow the
rule's applicability to few circumstances when negligence is at issue.
Absent legislative change in allowable exceptions to 407's general rule,
it is questionable whether subsequent repairs will be excluded in neg-
ligence cases. However, since "knowledge" is not an issue in strict
liability due to the fact that knowledge is imputed absent evidence to
the contrary, the article should apply to all "blameworthiness" inquiries
in those cases.
V. CONCLUSION
As the legal issues and policy considerations of Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 407 become more entangled, it appears that considerable
confusion has erupted in applying the rule. The first step in assessing
the applicability of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 to unforeseen
circumstances should focus on issues of relevancy. Relevancy should be
a requisite condition for the admissibility of subsequent measures. If
the relevancy concerns are the same in a strict liability case (in which
applicability of article 407 may seem doubtful) as they would be in a
negligence case (in which article 407 undoubtedly applies), then an a
pari ratione interpretation of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407
justifies the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures.
Courts which recognize the strict liability exception concentrate more
on the policy consideration of favoring beneficial over detrimental human
behavior. Attempts to distinguish between delictual theories of liability
result in artificial distinctions which are not legally persuasive because
all torts under Louisiana law possess degrees of culpability or negligence.
Across-the-board application of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407
to all tort litigation allows the legislative choice of exclusion to prevail,
and the result is a greater emphasis on fairness and efficiency in dispute
resolution and avoidance of needless speculation. However, in the light
of the broad exceptions which accompany the general rule of 407, it
seems questionable whether the present article is workable in light of
its historical purpose.
David M. Bienvenu, Jr.
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